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A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments

By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan Joint Force Quarterly 75

The numerous, increasingly advanced cruise missiles being developed and deployed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have largely flown under the public’s radar. This article surveys PRC cruise missile programs and assesses their implications for broader People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities, especially in a Taiwan scenario.

This article draws on findings from a multiyear comprehensive study of Chinese cruise missiles based exclusively on open sources. More than 1,000 discrete Chinese-language sources were considered; several hundred have been incorporated in some form. In descending level of demonstrated authority, these Chinese sources include PLA doctrinal publications (for example, Science of Campaigns ) describing how cruise missiles might be used in operational scenarios; specialized technical analyses ( Winged Missiles Journal ) from civilian and military institutes detailing many specific aspects of such weapons and their supporting infrastructure; didactic PLA discussions ( Modern Navy and People’s Navy ); generalist deliberations on the development trajectory and operational use of cruise missiles ( Naval and Merchant Ships and Modern Ships ); and unattributed speculation on a variety of Web sites. To be accessible to a general audience, this article includes only a fraction of the several hundred citations found in the full study, together with several related sources.

These Chinese sources were supplemented with a wide variety of English-language sources, including—in descending level of demonstrated authority—U.S. Government reports, analyses by scholars and think tanks, and online databases. The authors drew on their combined technical, arms control, and Chinese analysis experience to compare and assess information for reliability.

The result is a study whose details must be treated with caution, but whose larger findings are likely to hold.

YJ-62 antiship cruise missile launched by transporter erector launcher (Courtesy Sino Defense )

China’s military modernization is focused on building modern ground, naval, air, and missile forces capable of fighting and winning local wars under “informatized conditions.” The principal planning scenario has been a military campaign against Taiwan, which would require the PLA to deter or defeat U.S. intervention. Beijing is now broadening this focus to its Near Seas (Yellow, East, and South China seas) more generally.

The PLA has sought to acquire asymmetric “assassin’s mace” technologies and systems to overcome a superior adversary and couple them to the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems necessary for swift and precise execution of short-duration, high-intensity wars.

A key element of the PLA’s investment in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities is the development and deployment of large numbers of highly accurate antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) on a range of ground, naval, and air platforms. China’s growing arsenal of cruise missiles and the delivery platforms and C4ISR systems necessary to employ them pose new defense and nonproliferation challenges for the United States and its regional partners.

Military Value

Chinese writers rightly recognize cruise missiles’ numerous advantages. Cruise missiles are versatile military tools due to their potential use for precision conventional strike missions and wide range of employment options. Although China appears heavily focused on precision conventional delivery, cruise missiles could also be employed to deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Due to their superior aerodynamic flight stability compared to ballistic missiles, cruise missiles—by conservative estimates—enlarge the lethal area for biological attacks by a factor of 10.

Modern cruise missiles offer land, sea, and air launch options, allowing a “two-stage” form of delivery that extends the already substantial range of the missiles themselves. They may also be placed in canisters for extended deployments in harsh environments. Because cruise missiles are compact and have limited support requirements, ground-based platforms can be highly mobile, contributing to prelaunch survivability. Moreover, cruise missiles need only rudimentary launch-pad stability, enabling shoot-and-scoot tactics.

Since cruise missile engines or motors do not produce prominent infrared signatures on launch, they are not believed to be detectable by existing space-warning systems, reducing their vulnerability to post-launch counterforce attacks. The potential combination of supersonic speed, small radar signature, and very low altitude flight profile enables cruise missiles to stress naval- and ground-based air defense systems as well as airborne surveillance and tracking radars, increasing the likelihood that they will successfully penetrate defenses. 1 Employed in salvos, perhaps in tandem with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles could saturate defenses with large numbers of missiles arriving at a specific target within a short time.

At the same time, optimal employment of cruise missiles imposes significant requirements: accurate and timely intelligence, suitable and ideally stealthy and survivable delivery platforms, mission planning technology, command, control, and communications systems, and damage assessment. China has lagged in these areas, but its experts recognize their importance, and the relevant Chinese organizations are working hard to make progress.

Institutional and Organizational Actors

China began introducing ASCMs into its inventory in the late 1950s. The Fifth Academy under China’s Ministry of National Defense was assigned the lead role in coordinating national efforts in ASCM research, design, and licensed production. Established in 1956 with U.S.-trained scientist Qian Xuesen as its first director, the Fifth Academy was instrumental in China’s cruise missile development. Acting on guidance from the Central Military Commission, in 1958 the PLA Navy (PLAN) headquarters built an ASCM test site at Liaoxi, Liaoning Province.

Following several bilateral agreements, the Soviet Union transferred Type 542 KS-1 Komet (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] designation: SSC-2A Salish) shore-to-ship and Type 544 P-15 Termit (NATO designation: SS-N-2A Styx) antiship missiles, models, and technical data to China beginning in 1959. Moscow was to assist Beijing with these and other missile programs. The P-15 would provide the basic foundation for China’s future development of more advanced ASCMs and eventually LACMs.

In 1960, Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company established an assembly line to initiate ASCM production; it would later produce Shangyou-, Haiying-, and Yingji-series ASCMs. Despite the departure of Soviet advisors in September 1960, China conducted its first successful missile test that November. In 1964, China’s first ASCM, a license-produced version of the P-15, passed factory tests. The following year, its first flight test was successful. In late 1967, the resulting “Shangyou-1” missile was approved for production, and it entered service in the late 1960s. 2

As part of China’s efforts to develop an indigenous defense industry base, cruise missile programs received high-level political support from the beginning. In 1969, Zhou Enlai reportedly approved the establishment of a Military Industry Enterprise Base to produce ASCMs. Top leaders allocated funding and human capital and helped protect programs from political interference during the Cultural Revolution.

Yet this support has an important caveat: political leaders placed the highest priority on nuclear and ballistic missile programs given their strategic deterrence function. Cruise missiles, while prioritized more highly than aircraft and some other armaments, suffered from their logical application as armaments for the air force and navy and were subordinated to ground forces. Moreover, as the early Nanchang connection indicates, ASCMs were initially developed within China’s aviation industry. This fact, and the industry’s connection to a politically suspect PLA Air Force (PLAAF), imposed significant limitations.

Cruise missile programs therefore encountered more problems and registered slower progress than their ballistic missile counterparts. Not until the late 1960s and early 1970s was China able to produce its own modified derivatives of early Soviet-model cruise missiles. While recent years have witnessed remarkable progress in ASCMs such as the YJ-62 and LACMs such as the YJ-63/AKD-63 and DH-10, China continues to rely on foreign technological support—particularly Russian and Ukrainian design assistance.

To address persistent problems in its defense research, development, and acquisition system, China has converted numbered ministries to corporations, encouraged competition (with mixed results), and separated military requirements and evaluations (General Armaments Department) from civilian defense industry management and production (formerly the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense, now the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense). China has simultaneously worked to maximize access to foreign technology and employs an extensive bureaucracy to facilitate its transfer (very effectively) and absorption (less effectively).

China’s cruise missile design, research, development, and manufacturing are now concentrated in a single business division within one of two state aerospace conglomerates, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Third Academy. One of seven design academies under CASIC—which has over 100,000 employees—the Third Academy is China’s principal research and development (R&D) and manufacturing entity for cruise missiles; all others are secondary. Established in 1961, the Third Academy has been involved in the design and development of 20 types of cruise missiles, including the indigenous Haiying- and Yingji-series and their export versions. 3 Today, it boasts 10 research institutes and 2 factories, with over 13,000 employees, including 2,000 researchers and around 6,000 technicians.

China’s aviation industry remains involved in cruise missile R&D and production. Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (formerly Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company), under Aviation Industry Corporation of China, produced Feilong-series cruise missiles for export. 4

Finally, for three decades China has marketed a wide range of indigenously produced cruise missiles (and other weapons systems) through China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC), the CASIC Third Academy’s export management branch. Established in 1980, CPMIEC is a member of the Xinshidai Group and jointly owned by CASIC and the Chinese Aerospace Science and Technical Corporation.

Antiship Cruise Missile Developments

Like other nations, China has come to regard ASCMs as an increasingly potent means of shaping the outcome of military conflicts and thereby also strengthening peacetime deterrence. China has developed its own advanced, highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series) while also importing Russian supersonic ASCMs, which have no operational Western equivalents. (See table 1 for a list of Chinese ASCMs.)

China’s most sophisticated and threatening imported Russian ASCMs include the 3M80E and 3M80MVE Moskit (NATO designation: SS-N-22 Sunburn) and the 3M54E Klub (NATO designation: SS-N-27B Sizzler). China’s Sovremenny -class destroyers (Project 956E and 956EM) boast the supersonic Sunburn ASCMs that were first delivered to China in 2000–2001. The Project 956E ships carry the early 3M80E missile with a range of 120 kilometers (km), while the Project 956EM destroyers have the 3M80MVE that has an optional longer range (240 km) through the incorporation of a second, high-altitude flight profile setting. But this longer range comes at a price, as a 3M80MVE missile using the higher altitude profile would be detectable at much greater distances and thus more vulnerable to attacks from advanced air defense systems, such as Aegis. Both missiles execute sea-skimming attacks at an altitude of 7 meters and perform terminal maneuvers to reduce the target’s point defense systems effectiveness. The Sunburn is reported to have a speed of Mach 2.3 and has a 300-kilogram (kg) semi-armor piercing warhead. 5

Eight of China’s Kilo -class submarines are Project 636M variants fitted with the Klub-S missile system, which includes the 3M54E/SS-N-27B Sizzler ASCM—also known earlier as Novator Alpha. This missile is unique in that it combines a subsonic, low-altitude approach with a supersonic terminal attack conducted by a separating sprint vehicle. The 3M54E’s cruise range is 200 km at a speed of Mach 0.6–0.8. This is followed by the release of a solid-rocket-propelled, sea-skimming sprint vehicle that travels the last 20 km to the target at a speed of Mach 2.9. The 3M54E ASCM has a 200-kg semi-armor-piercing warhead.

As in so many other areas, even as China seeks the best foreign systems available, it continues to develop increasingly capable indigenous systems. Of China’s foremost indigenous ASCMs, the YJ-82 and YJ-83/83K are the most widely deployed, while the YJ-62 is among the most advanced. The YJ-82 is a solid-rocket-propelled, submarine-launched missile contained in a buoyant launch canister that is, for all intents and purposes, identical to the U.S. submarine-launched Harpoon. While credited with a range of 42 km, the lack of a solid-rocket booster, as with the surface-ship-launched YJ-8/8A, strongly suggests that the YJ-82’s range will be shorter. The missile has a speed of Mach 0.9 and a terminal sea-skimming attack altitude of 5 to 7 meters, and it carries a 165-kg high-explosive fragmenting warhead. 6

The YJ-83/83K missile represents an evolutionary improvement over the YJ-8/8A and the exported C802. Entering service with the PLAN in 1998–1999, the YJ-83 missile has the same propulsion system as the export C802 missile but uses an indigenous CTJ-2 turbojet instead of the French-made TRI 60-2. By replacing the bulky electronics and inertial reference unit (IRU) of the YJ-8/8A/C802 with digital microprocessors and a strap-down IRU, additional volume was made available to increase the YJ-83’s range to 180 km at a speed of Mach 0.9. The air-launched YJ-83K has a rated range of 250 km at the same speed. Both the YJ-83 and 83K possess a slightly larger high-explosive fragmenting warhead of 190 kg. The YJ-83 is the main ASCM of the PLAN and is currently outfitted on virtually every surface combatant in active service. The YJ-83K can be carried by large and small aircraft alike and has been seen on JH-7/A fighter-bombers and H-6 bombers. The export variant of the YJ-83/83K is the C802A and the air-launched C802AK. 7

In September 2005, China unveiled the C602 ASCM for the first time. The small-scale model was clearly larger than the one of the C802 nearby, and the system brochure boasted of a longer range (280 km), global positioning system (GPS) guidance—an unprecedented claim—and a larger semi-armor-piercing warhead (300 kg). The missile size was roughly consistent with large round launch canisters that had started showing up on coastal defense test sites and the Type 052C destroyers then under construction in 2004. The indigenous YJ-62 is very similar to the YJ-83 technologically and largely reflects an evolutionary change in size. While many journals, articles, and Web sites quote the YJ-62’s range as 280 km, this value is only appropriate to the export C602. China has limited the range of its export cruise missiles in conformance with the Missile Technology Control Regime restrictions of 300 km. The YJ-62 itself has a true range on the order of 400 kms. The long range likely necessitated the need for satellite navigation, and the YJ-62 is described as having the ability to use both GPS and Beidou constellations. The missile’s speed is between Mach 0.6 and 0.8, and it executes a sea-skimming terminal attack at 7 to 10 meters. With the exception of the Type 052C destroyers, the YJ-62 is only deployed in mobile coastal defense batteries. 8

Finally, China has been working diligently on producing its own supersonic cruise missiles after the failed YJ-1/C101 and HY-3/C301. Both the YJ-12 and YJ-18 are undergoing tests and represent the next phase in China’s ASCM capabilities. The YJ-12 appears to be a considerably lengthened Russian Kh-31–type missile and is speculated to have a range of 250 km and a speed of Mach 2.5. The YJ-12 is probably an aircraft-carried weapon only. Thus far, only certain H-6 bombers have been seen with a long pylon necessary to support a large missile with an integrated ramjet/booster propulsion system. 9

The YJ-18 appears to be a Chinese copy of the 3M54E Klub. This missile has been described as having a cruise range of 180 km at Mach 0.8 and a sprint range of 40 km at Mach 2.5 to 3.0. It has been reported to be submarine torpedo tube–capable, which is consistent with the CH-SS-NX-13 missile discussion in the Department of Defense’s 2010 and 2011 annual reports to Congress. The YJ-18 has also been characterized as being able to be launched from a surface ship’s vertical launching system (VLS), which is consistent with the capabilities of the generalized or universal VLS being fitted to the new Type 052D destroyer. 10

Along with the growing improvements in ASCM performance, the PLAN has begun to expand its training and has become more diverse and realistic in recent years with increasing focus on cruise missile operations. Beijing has furnished its ASCMs with improved guidance and has started to implement satellite navigation capabilities. Most of the PLAN warships now have a dedicated over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting system, either the Russian-supplied Mineral-ME, or the indigenous version. Still, OTH targeting remains a challenge.

Chinese researchers are studying how to best overcome Aegis defenses and target adversary vulnerabilities. ASCMs are increasingly poised to challenge U.S. surface vessels, especially in situations where the quantity of missiles fired can overwhelm Aegis air defense systems through saturation and multi-axis tactics. More advanced future Chinese aircraft carriers might be used to bring ASCM- and LACM-capable aircraft within range of U.S. targets.

A consistent theme in Chinese writings is that China’s own ships and other platforms are themselves vulnerable to cruise missile attack. But China appears to believe it can compensate by further developing its capacity to threaten enemy warships with large volumes of fire.

Land-Attack Cruise Missile Developments

China has deployed two subsonic LACMs, the air-launched YJ-63/AKD-63 with a range of 200 km and the 1,500+ km-range ground-launched DH-10. (See table 2 for a list of Chinese LACMs.) Both systems benefited from ample technical assistance from foreign sources, primarily the Soviet Union/Russia. The first-generation YJ-63 is an air-launched LACM that employs an electro-optical (EO) seeker with man-in-the-loop steering via a command data link. This missile reportedly reached initial operating capability in 2004, was first seen in 2005 in Internet photography, and is right at the cusp as to when China incorporated satellite navigation in some of their weapons systems. It is currently unknown if the YJ-63/AKD-63 has this ability. 11 In addition to the YJ-63, two other LACMs use some sort of a command data link to feed back the data gathered from the EO sensor: the YJ-83KH and the K/AKD-88. 12 The second-generation DH-10 has a satellite navigation/inertial guidance system, but may also use terrain contour mapping for redundant midcourse guidance and a digital scene-matching sensor to permit an accuracy of 10 meters. Development of China’s Beidou / Compass navigation-positioning satellite network is partly intended to eliminate dependence on the U.S. GPS for guidance.

Beijing has purchased foreign systems and assistance to complement its own indigenous LACM efforts. From Israel, it has received Harpy antiradiation drones with standoff ranges of 400+ km. It is conceivable that China may also have the Russian Klub 3M-14E SS-NX-30 LACM, which can be launched from the PLAN’s Project 636M Kilo -class submarines and deliver a 400-kg warhead to a range of 300 km. But there is little evidence at present to support this possibility.

While current DH-10 ground-launch cruise missiles and YJ-63/AKD-63 air-launched systems are most relevant for a Taiwan contingency, there are strong signs that China is expanding its inventory to include both air-launched and ship-launched LACMs. An air-launched version of the DH-10, called the CJ-20, has reportedly been tested on the H-6 bomber, which has the capability to carry four CJ-20 LACMs externally.

China’s Weapon Test Ship Dahua 892 has experimented with on-deck canister launchers that contain either YJ-18 ASCMs or DH-10 LACMs for at-sea testing. 13 Although most PLAN surface combatants have a limited capacity of 8 to 16 canister launchers—meaning tradeoffs between ASCMs and LACMs—China’s apparent interest in a sea-launched DH-10 strongly suggests that future PLAN destroyers, such as the new Type 052D, will likely be equipped with a new vertical launching system, with a greater capacity to carry both ASCMs and LACMs.

Should China add large numbers of air- and sea-launched LACMs to its already substantial inventory of ground-launched cruise missiles, it would significantly extend the range of the PLA’s capacity to employ LACMs to deal with contingencies beyond Taiwan and the rest of its immediate maritime periphery. 14 Time and dedicated effort will increase the PLA’s ability to employ LACMs, even in challenging combined-arms military campaigns.

Cruise Missile Platforms

A given type of cruise missile can typically be launched from many different platforms. Over the past decade, the PLA has commissioned numerous new, modernized ships, submarines, and aircraft capable of launching cruise missiles. China has produced a new array of frigates and destroyers that carry sophisticated medium- to long-range ASCMs, and some PLAAF/PLAN aviation aircraft can carry LACMs in addition to ASCMs. Song -, Kilo -, and Yuan -class diesel submarines are equipped with Russian and indigenous ASCMs. Shang -class nuclear-powered submarines have or will have ASCMs, as will their Type 095 follow-ons when they enter service. 15 China thus appears to be making a concerted effort to develop its delivery capabilities from air, surface, and subsurface platforms simultaneously. In the near term, China will likely continue to expand its cruise missile inventory and precision delivery capabilities.

Cruise Missile Employment, Doctrine, and Training

China’s new ASCM and LACM programs—like its current military modernization efforts more broadly—are focused on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and other proximate disputed areas, which clearly include the possibility of U.S. intervention. The land, sea, and air components of such a contingency would involve ASCMs and LACMs. China appears to believe in the value of large-scale attacks in all three domains.

Since President Bill Clinton’s decision to deploy two aircraft carriers to waters near Taiwan in response to China’s March 1996 ballistic missile tests, PLA planners have focused on U.S. aircraft carriers as the main threat to the success of such PLA missions. Chinese strategists have thus sought ways to target U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs); Chinese specialists are acutely aware of carrier vulnerabilities, having conducted a wide variety of research directed toward threatening aircraft carriers with “trump cards” such as cruise missiles. Aegis ships are also viewed as essential targets; without their protection, carriers are much more vulnerable to attack.

Various Chinese writings and the logical employment of forces China has been developing suggest that in the event of a maritime conflict with U.S. forces, the PLAN is likely to undertake massive multi-axis ASCM attacks against U.S. CSGs and their Aegis air defense perimeters. The PLAN’s focused experimentation and training in long-range sea strike, its variety of indigenous ASCM weapons, and modernization of ASCM delivery platforms may yield a high probability of success for this effort.

Potential Employment in a Taiwan Scenario

Chinese ASCMs and LACMs could be used in conjunction with other A2/AD capabilities to attack U.S. and partners’ naval forces, land bases, and sea bases that would be critical for U.S. efforts to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. While cross-Strait relations are relatively stable at present, Beijing worries that that could change, and in any case wants to achieve reunification in peacetime, supported in part by its increasing military advantage over Taiwan.

Operating in tandem with China’s huge inventory of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, LACMs could severely complicate Taiwan’s capacity to use its air force to defend against Chinese attacks. Chinese military planners view LACMs as particularly effective against targets requiring precision accuracy (for example, airfield hangars and command and control facilities). They also view large-salvo attacks by LACMs and ballistic missiles as the best means to overwhelm enemy missile defenses.

Chinese planners emphasize the shock and paralytic effects of combined ballistic and LACM attacks against enemy airbases, which could greatly increase the effectiveness of follow-on aircraft strikes. These effects depend significantly on the number of launchers available to deliver missiles. China currently has between 255 and 305 ballistic missile and LACM launchers within range of Taiwan, which are capable of delivering sustained pulses of firepower against a number of critical airfields, missile defense sites, early warning radars, command and control facilities, logistical storage sites, and critical civilian infrastructure such as electrical distribution. 16

Proliferation Implications

If China’s past record of proliferating ballistic missiles and technology is any indication of its intentions vis-à-vis cruise missile transfers, the consequences could be highly disruptive for the nonproliferation regime and in spreading A2/AD capabilities. China has sold ASCMs to other countries, including Iran. Beijing is suspected of furnishing Pakistan with either complete LACMs or components for local assembly.

China is not a full member of the 34-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) but has pledged to adhere to the MTCR’s guidelines for missile and missile technology exports. Beijing began seeking MTCR membership in 2004 but has thus far been denied due to concerns about its poor proliferation record. The reason why China represents a critical wildcard regarding the further spread of cruise missiles is that Beijing’s current compliance with its pledge to follow MTCR guidelines is problematic, especially regarding cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. China needs not only to improve its commitment to address shortcomings in implementation and enforcement but also to work with exporters on improving their compliance with export control regulations and increase its own governmental capacity to deal with the explosive growth of exporting industries across China’s huge landmass. This would require significant efforts on China’s part. However, if China becomes a fully compliant MTCR member, it would be an important achievement in limiting widespread LACM proliferation.

China has invested considerable resources both in acquiring foreign cruise missiles and technology and in developing its own indigenous cruise missile design and production capabilities. These efforts are bearing fruit in the form of relatively advanced ASCMs and LACMs deployed on a wide range of older and modern air, ground, surface-ship, and subsurface platforms.

To realize the full benefits, China will need additional investments in all the relevant enabling technologies and systems required to optimize cruise missile performance. Shortcomings remain in intelligence support, command and control, platform stealth and survivability, and post-attack damage assessment, all of which are critical to mission effectiveness. To employ cruise missiles to maximum effect, the PLA needs to be able to locate targets at a distance, to deploy its air, surface, and submarine platforms within range of those targets, and then to execute a complex, carefully orchestrated joint air and missile campaign—potentially over many days. Operational success also requires accurate, near-real-time intelligence and post-attack assessment capabilities.

A successful campaign depends on both human and technical factors—extremely well-trained military personnel who have practiced these routines in diverse ways over many years and the command and control architecture needed to deal with complex combined-arms operations. Chinese planners envision establishing a Firepower Coordination Center within the Joint Theater Command, which would manage the application of air and missile firepower. Separate coordination cells would be created to deal with missile strikes, airstrikes, special operations, and ground and naval forces. Absolutely critical to achieving the delicate timing separating waves of missile strikes designed to leverage the effectiveness of subsequent aircraft attacks is developing the skill to coordinate and deconflict large salvos of missiles and waves of aircraft operating in multiple sectors. Chinese doctrine calls for such attacks, but the PLA’s ability to execute such a complex joint campaign against a capable adversary has never been demonstrated.

JH-7A fighter-bomber carrying KD-88 land-attack cruise missiles and drop tanks (Courtesy Sino Defense )

The future development of China’s cruise missile systems will depend on multiple factors. One is the role of ASCMs/LACMs in Chinese defense doctrines and military campaign strategies and their relative cost-effectiveness compared to other weapons systems. Second, cruise missile development, and indeed China’s overall defense modernization, will be determined by the government’s priorities as Beijing assesses its economic, social, and defense needs against the security environment and real and perceived threats. Third, U.S. military developments, including missile defenses, its own deployment and use of offensive weapons, and its intentions, will influence how China will react and thus the role of cruise missiles within PLA doctrine and force structure. Finally, the capabilities of China’s defense industry will continue to be a critical factor in whether Chinese cruise missiles can continue to develop and close the technical gap with other major powers such as the United States and Russia.

ASCMs and LACMs have significantly improved PLA combat capabilities and are key components in Chinese efforts to develop A2/AD capabilities that increase the costs and risks for U.S. forces operating near China, including in a Taiwan contingency. Effective ASCMs give the PLAN an expeditionary capability and the ability to deploy and take on other navies. LACMs give China new conventional strike options. These apply most to Taiwan, where ground-, air-, and sea-based systems could be employed, but some Chinese LACMs also have the range to reach Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam and will provide a limited capability wherever the PLAN can deploy. China plans to employ cruise missiles in ways that exploit synergies with other strike systems, including using cruise missiles to degrade air defenses and command and control facilities to enable follow-on airstrikes.

Defenses and other responses to PRC cruise missile capabilities exist, but they require greater attention and a more focused effort. They include the development of more effective missile defenses, technical countermeasures, and creative operational responses. Missile defenses against large-volume Chinese LACM threats will need special attention, if the poor U.S. performance against Iraq’s primitive and small number of LACMs in Operation Iraqi Freedom is an indicator of U.S. weaknesses vis-à-vis such threats. JFQ

• To be sure, the combination of all three of these aspects is difficult to achieve. A supersonic missile is usually not stealthy, particularly from an infrared perspective, and such missiles tend to fly higher to get decent engagement ranges. To delay detection and thereby reduce reaction time, subsonic missiles typically use low-altitude flight profiles. Combining all of them into one missile is difficult to do, and China currently lacks a missile with all three of these characteristics. Information presented by Christopher P. Carlson at the Workshop on Open Source Exploitation, sponsored by Naval War College and Potomac Foundation, Vienna, VA, March 3, 2014.
• A good synopsis of Chinese antiship cruise missiles (ASCM) development can be found in Wang Wei, “Development of the PLA-Navy’s Anti-ship Missile,” Shipborne Weapons 5 (May 2008), 35–47.
• For instance, the HY-2/4 ASCMs have been exported as the C-201/201W.
• This series is essentially defunct, having not competed well with the export versions of the HY and YJ series.
• Russia’s Arms and Technologies: The XXI Century Encyclopedia—Naval Weapons , Volume III (Moscow: Arms and Technologies Publishing House, 2001); Machine Building Design Bureau marketing brochure—3M80E antiship attack missile-weapon complex. For 3M80MVE characteristics, see the Tactical Missiles Corporation JSC Web site at <http://eng.ktrv.ru/production_eng/323/507/541/?PHPSESSID=b56ca0fa59423f9a752a0ccdc67eb72a>.
• Christopher P. Carlson, “China’s Eagle Strike—Eight Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: YJ-81, YJ-81, and C802 (Part 2),” Defense Media Network, February 6, 2013, available at < www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/chinas-eagle-strike-eight-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-yj-81-yj-82-and-c802/ >.
• “C602: Anti-Ship Missile Weapon System,” China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation marketing brochure, 2010.
• Christopher P. Carlson, “YJ-12 Photographic Analysis,” February 2014; “Chinese YJ-12 Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Revealed,” Chinese Military Review , January 2013, available at < http://chinesemilitaryreview.blogspot.com/2013/01/chinese-yj-12-supersonic-anti-ship.html >.
• Christopher P. Carlson, “Deciphering the Eagle Strike-8 Family of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles,” presentation at Workshop on Open Source Exploitation.
• "PLA’s Tactical Air-To-Surface Missiles (Part 1),” SinoDefence , February 18, 2014, available at < http://sinodefence.com/2014/02/18/plas-tactical-air-to-surface-missiles-part-1/ >.
• Pan Wenlin, “Small Gas-Turbine Unit and China’s Antiship Cruise Missiles,” Shipborne Weapons 8 (August 2010), 14–25; “KD-63 (YJ-63), K/AKD-63,” Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons , January 28, 2014, available at < www.janes.com >.
• “Navalized DH-10 LACM,” China Defense Blog , July 25, 2012, available at < http://china-defense.blogspot.com/2012/07/navalized-cj-10-lacm.html >.
• James C. Bussert, “China Destroyer Consolidates Innovations, Other Ship Advances,” Signal , December 1, 2013, available at < www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/11972 >.
• Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 , Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2013), 4, available at < www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_china_report_final.pdf >.
• Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2009 , available at < www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_2009.pdf >. Figures were derived from the chart on page 66 of the 2009 report. Only CSS-6 and CSS-7 missile launchers and DH-10s were considered. As the most important factor in delivering pulses of power, missile launchers (not missiles) were the focus. Like aircraft launched from carriers, missiles launched are the appropriate measure of the intensity of fire within a unit of time.

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A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions

By Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan Book

Executive Summary

The military value of cruise missiles.

• Cruise missiles are versatile military tools due to their potential use for precision conventional strike missions and the wide range of employment options. 
• Modern cruise missiles offer land, sea, and air launch options, allowing a “two-stage” form of delivery that extends their already substantial range. They may also be placed in canisters for extended deployments in harsh environments. 
• Because cruise missiles are compact and have limited support requirements, ground-launched platforms can be highly mobile, contributing to prelaunch survivability. Moreover, cruise missiles need only rudimentary launch-pad stability, enabling shoot-and-scoot tactics. 
• Since cruise missile engines or motors do not produce prominent infrared signatures on launch, they are not believed to be detectable by existing space-warning systems, reducing their vulnerability to post-launch counterforce attacks. 
• The potentially supersonic speed, small radar signature, and very low altitude flight profile of cruise missiles stress air defense systems and airborne surveillance and tracking radars, increasing the likelihood that they will successfully penetrate defenses. 
• Employed in salvos, perhaps in tandem with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles could saturate defenses with large numbers of missiles arriving at a specific target in a short time.
• Optimal employment of cruise missiles requires accurate and timely intelligence; suitable and ideally stealthy and survivable delivery platforms; mission planning technology; command, control, and communications systems; and damage assessment.

Chinese  Antiship Cruise Missile Developments 

• China, like other nations, has come to regard ASCMs as an increasingly potent means of shaping the outcome of military conflicts. 
• China has developed its own advanced, highly capable ASCMs (the YJ series) while also importing Russian supersonic ASCMs, which have no operational Western equivalents. 
• China is capable of launching its ASCMs from a growing variety of land, air, ship, and undersea platforms, providing redundant multiaxis means of massing offensive firepower against targets at sea (or at least against their predicted locations).
• Virtually every new surface ship and conventionally powered submarine in the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) can launch ASCMs, allowing these platforms to serve as “aquatic TELs” (Transporter-Erector-Launchers). Navy training has become more diverse and realistic in recent years with increasing focus on cruise missile operations. 
• Beijing has furnished its ASCMs with improved guidance and has recently begun selling satellite navigation capabilities. Still, over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting remains a challenge. 
• Chinese researchers are studying how to best overcome Aegis defenses and target adversary vulnerabilities. ASCMs are increasingly poised to challenge U.S. surface vessels, especially in situations where the quantity of missiles fired can overwhelm Aegis air defense systems through saturation and multiaxis tactics. 
• Possible future uses of Chinese aircraft carriers might include bringing ASCM- and LACM-capable aircraft within range of U.S. targets. 
• A consistent theme in Chinese writings is that China’s own ships and other platforms are themselves vulnerable to cruise missile attack. But China appears to believe it can compensate by further developing its capacity to threaten enemy warships with large volumes of fire.

Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missile Developments

• China has deployed two subsonic LACMs, the air-launched YJ-63 with a range of 200 kilometers (km) and the 1,500+ km-range ground-launched DH-10. Both systems benefited from ample technical assistance from foreign sources, primarily the Soviet Union/Russia. 
• The first-generation YJ-63 employs inertial navigation complemented by an electro-optical terminal sensor to achieve 10–15 meter (m) accuracy. 
• The second-generation DH-10 has a GPS/inertial guidance system but may also use terrain contour mapping for redundant midcourse guidance and a digital scene-matching sensor to permit an accuracy of 10 m. 
• Development of the Chinese Beidou/Compass navigation-positioning satellite network is partly intended to eliminate dependence on the U.S. GPS for guidance. 
• Beijing has purchased foreign systems and assistance to complement its own indigenous LACM efforts. It has received Harpy anti-radiation drones with stand-off ranges of 400 km or more from Israel. China may also have the Russian Klub 3M-14E SS-N-30 LACM,5 which can be launched from some PLAN Kilo-class submarines and deliver a 400-kilogram (kg) warhead to a range of 300 km.
• Time and dedicated effort will increase the PLA’s ability to employ LACMs even in challenging combined-arms military campaigns. 

Potential Employment in a Taiwan Scenario

• Chinese ASCMs and LACMs could be used in conjunction with other A2/AD capabilities to attack U.S. naval forces and bases that would be critical for U.S. efforts to respond to a mainland Chinese attack on Taiwan. 
• Operating in tandem with China’s huge inventory of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, LACMs could severely complicate Taiwan’s capacity to use its air force to thwart Chinese attack options. 
• Chinese military planners view LACMs as particularly effective against targets requiring precision accuracy (for example, airfield hangars and command and control facilities). They also view large-salvo attacks by LACMs and ballistic missiles as the best means to overwhelm enemy missile defenses. 
• Chinese planners emphasize the shock and paralytic effects of combined ballistic and LACM attacks against enemy airbases, which could greatly increase the effectiveness of follow-on aircraft strikes. These effects depend significantly on the number of launchers available to deliver missiles.
• China currently has 255–305 ballistic missile and LACM launchers within range of Taiwan, which are capable of delivering sustained pulses of firepower against a  number of critical airfields, missile defense sites, early warning radars, command and control facilities, logistical storage sites, and critical civilian infrastructure such as electrical distribution. 

Proliferation Implications of China’s Cruise Missiles 

• If China’s past record of proliferating ballistic missiles and technology is any indication of its intentions vis-à-vis cruise missile transfers, the consequences could be highly disruptive for the nonproliferation regime and in spreading A2/AD capabilities. 
• China has sold ASCMs to other countries, including Iran. 
• Beijing is suspected of furnishing Pakistan with either complete LACMs or components for local assembly. 
• China’s lack of adherence to the principles of the 34-nation Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is especially problematic regarding cruise missiles and UAVs. 
• China has sought unsuccessfully to become a full member of the MTCR since 2004. However, should China become a fully compliant MTCR member, it would be a salient achievement in limiting widespread LACM proliferation. 

Assessment 

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More Than Missiles: China Previews its New Way of War

Table of Contents

Brief by Ian Williams and Masao Dahlgren

Published October 16, 2019

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• China’s October 1 display of military hardware revealed a nation seeking to supplant the United States as the dominant military and technological power in the Asia-Pacific region.
• Many of these new systems are designed to degrade U.S. command, control, situational awareness, and precision targeting while enhancing China’s own capabilities in these areas.
• The parade illustrated China’s prioritization of high-technology systems like electronic warfare, unmanned systems, and precision guided munitions. Such weaponry enhances China’s ability to impair U.S. forces from conducting complex military operations in much of the Asia-Pacific.

On October 1, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) celebrated the seventieth anniversary of its founding. Among the pageantry was a military parade in which the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) performed a highly orchestrated show of strength, exhibiting many of its strategic weapon systems. While China has regularly held such displays in the past, this year’s parade was exceptional for the number and diversity of new, high-tech weapons. New systems represented 40 percent of the weapons showcased. i Although a carefully choreographed piece of propaganda, the parade nevertheless provides clues about China’s emerging warfighting doctrine. In doing so, it also revealed a nation seeking to supplant the United States as the dominant military and technological power in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s messaging around the procession emphasized China’s focus on “informationized armed forces” and attaining technological dominance. ii Indeed, many of the systems seen on October 1 seem intended to bolster China’s information, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and conventional precision strike capabilities. Others appear aimed at degrading U.S. capabilities in those same areas. Specifically, the weaponry China displayed on October 1 signal China’s interest in:

• Augmenting its precision-guided strike complex with improved ISR capabilities;
• Disrupting U.S. communication and information networks, threatening U.S. situational awareness and precision targeting;
• Holding U.S. and allied forces in the Asia-Pacific at risk with maneuvering munitions that challenge existing U.S. air and missile defenses; and
• Increasing undersea situational awareness, challenging the dominance of U.S. submarines.

In concert with these new conventional capabilities, China demonstrated several new or upgraded nuclear delivery systems. These mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) appear primarily intended to enhance the survivability and penetration capacity of China’s nuclear forces. Moreover, the display served to highlight the technical sophistication and modernity of China’s strategic missile force, a central consideration in Chinese nuclear decisionmaking. iii

Despite their increased sophistication, the nuclear delivery vehicles displayed fill similar roles to previous systems, signaling continuity with existing Chinese limited nuclear doctrine. iv This is in contrast with Russia, which is significantly expanding the scope and ambition of its nuclear doctrine. And while U.S. intelligence projects that China could double the size of its nuclear force in the coming decade, its arsenal will remain a fraction of the size of U.S. and Russian forces. v However, observers remain concerned over the dual-capability of China’s medium-range systems. China’s DF-26, for example, has both conventional and nuclear variants, and similar uncertainties persist over the nuclear capability of China’s hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) programs. Chinese commentators made a point, however, to characterize its new DF-17 HGV as conventional-only.

China’s embrace of high-tech “informationized” warfare reflects the many lessons the PLA has learned from observing U.S. operations over the past two decades. During this period, the United States enjoyed the uncontested use of advanced ISR and C2 networks. The PLA has watched this advantage become a dependency, one which it is now looking to exploit. This brief will provide an overview of the systems and capabilities the PRC emphasized in its 70th anniversary celebration and attempt to explain how they fit into China’s military vision. These include electronic warfare, drones, and China’s array of new missiles.

Electronic Warfare

Consistent with its goal of degrading U.S. ISR, the PLA exhibited a large variety of electronic warfare systems. vi These included numerous ground-based jammers. vii The PLA also revealed two varieties of aerial jamming drones, including an electronic-warfare variant of its ASN-207 UAV, which previously only performed reconnaissance missions. According to Chinese state media, this variety of electronic warfare platforms highlighted China’s efforts “to seize the right to control information” during military operations. viii

The United States’ wireless battle networks are essential for completing its “kill chain,” the process of integrating intelligence, command, and fire control data to employ precision-guided weapons. By investing in electronic warfare assets, the PLA aims to sever a vital link in this chain. While a focus on information denial has long remained an element of PLA doctrine, this display of jamming units showcased the PLA’s information denial efforts across multiple domains—intended to disrupt U.S. communications on land, air, and sea. ix Underscoring this point was the presence of the PLA Strategic Support Force, China’s newly-formed cyber-, space-, and electronic-warfare service. The October 1 event was the first appearance of the PLASSF in a military parade. x

Several new drones also featured in the display. China revealed the GJ-11 (Gongji [“attack”]-11), a carrier-based unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) based off the PLA’s Lijian (“Sharp Sword”) testbed. xi Featuring a stealthy exhaust section and revised aerodynamics, the GJ-11 is designed to conduct long-range strikes and supply targeting information to Chinese missile forces.

In addition, China revealed the WZ-8, an air-launched supersonic drone. Likely released from a bomber, the rocket-propelled WZ-8 is intended to conduct reconnaissance and battle damage assessment on U.S. carrier strike groups. xii Though the WZ-8 is unlikely to possess the loitering capability needed to support missile targeting, it could aid Chinese aircraft in locating and targeting enemy surface forces. According to media reports, the drone may have already entered service with the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command. xiii

Finally, China displayed a new unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV). Designed to conduct “battlefield environment reconnaissance” and “enemy surveillance,” the drone represents a further development in China’s anti-submarine and underwater ISR capabilities. Although its effectiveness remains uncertain, it does show Chinese interest in chipping away at U.S. undersea dominance.

China’s limited ability to detect and track U.S. theater forces has previously constrained its strike potential. xiv By procuring new drones, satellites, and unmanned naval intelligence platforms, Beijing aims to complete its own kill chain.

The parade also showcased China’s investment in advanced missiles, revealing six previously unseen missile systems. These included three new cruise missiles (YJ-12B, YJ-18, and CJ-100), two ballistic missiles (JL-2 and DF-41), and a hypersonic glide vehicle (DF-17). China also showed several other recent systems, including the DF-31AG and DF-26.

YJ-12B, YJ-18 /-18A

First revealed in 2015, the YJ-12 is a ramjet-propelled supersonic anti-ship missile with an estimated range of 500 km. xv The parade marks the first public appearance of the YJ-12B, a ground-launched variant of the missile. According to media reports, the YJ-12B has already entered Chinese service.

The YJ-18, meanwhile, is a subsonic anti-ship missile with an estimated range between 220 and 540 km. xvi After cruising to the target under turbojet propulsion, the YJ-18 releases a rocket-propelled warhead which accelerates to supersonic velocities. Bearing an external resemblance to Russia’s 3M54TE cruise missile , the YJ-18 had been known but not publicly showcased prior to the parade. xvii

CJ-100/DF-100

Unknown to the public before the National Day celebration, the CJ-100 is most likely a long-range, supersonic cruise missile. xviii Footage revealed days before the parade indicates that the missile is vertically launched and uses ramjet propulsion. xix Little else is publicly known about it.

The DF-17, a “short to medium-range” ballistic missile, combines a DF-15 -like rocket booster with a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. xx First tested in January 2014, the missile had not been publicly displayed until the October 1 parade. xxi Public photographs of a similar hypersonic test article—the WU-14/DF-ZF—first surfaced in late 2017. xxii

According to Chinese state media, the DF-17 is intended to defeat U.S. and allied missile defenses, which struggle to engage low-flying, maneuvering threats. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles can modify their trajectory through most of their flight, creating uncertainty over where to commit defensive interceptors. This, however, makes boost-glide vehicles vulnerable to point defenses. Traveling at slower velocities than their ballistic counterparts, hypersonic glide vehicles retain less energy to spend on evasive maneuvers in terminal flight. xxiii

First unveiled in 2015, the DF-26 is an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a 4,000 km range. xxiv The missile can carry a variety of nuclear and conventional payloads and is typically seen with a maneuvering warhead. xxv Such a payload may aid in penetrating terminal missile defenses or striking mobile targets. According to Chinese media sources, China’s defense industry began developing the missile as early as 2008. xxvi China first tested the DF-26 in 2016, conducting its latest flight test in January 2019. xxvii China reportedly tested a rumored anti-ship variant, the DF-26B, in 2017. xxviii To successfully strike a moving target like a ship with a ballistic missile, however, would likely require an ISR asset providing near-real-time targeting information, most likely an unmanned aerial system.

During the parade, China also displayed an upgraded variant of the DF-5 , its oldest ICBM. xxix Designated the DF-5B, the missile entered service in 2015 and is the first variant of the 1970s-era DF-5 to carry multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV). Unlike China’s newer missiles, the DF-5B is silo-based and takes a considerable time to move or fire.

Despite analysts’ expectations, China did not showcase the DF-5C, a modernized DF-5 variant with a 10-MIRV payload. xxx Beijing may have tested the DF-5C as recently as 2017. xxxi Such an absence may reflect China’s emphasis on procuring new technologies; while the DF-5C test served to signal China’s resolve and demonstrate its ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, China may not intend to further develop the DF-5 platform. xxxii Though the “old-fashioned” DF-5-series remains a core element of China’s current force, its underlying technology has become nearly obsolete. xxxiii

Beijing’s inclusion of DF-31AG missiles in the parade reflects its focus on modernizing its nuclear forces. The DF-31 is a solid-fueled ICBM which entered Chinese service in 2006. xxxiv An upgraded variant, the DF-31A, possesses a range of up to 11,700 km and is fitted with a 1-3 megaton nuclear warhead. First displayed in mid-2017, the DF-31AG is the latest upgrade of the DF-31A, equipped with a ruggedized launch vehicle for traversing unpaved terrain. xxxv No longer limited to China’s roads, the DF-31AG could disperse to more remote areas, making it difficult to target.

The National Day Parade also marked the first public appearance of the JL-2 , a submarine-launched ballistic missile which underwent a troubled development period from 1983 to 2015. xxxvi This public display—combined with repeated declarations of the missile’s maturity—reflect Beijing’s growing confidence in its sea-based deterrent. Derived from the DF-31, the JL-2 reportedly possesses a maximum range of over 8,000 km and may be MIRV-capable.

The DF-41 ICBM represents the culmination of China’s strategic modernization efforts, occupying the final position in the 70th anniversary procession. While the missile’s existence was reported by the Pentagon since 1997, no complete images of the system became available until two missile brigades—armed with eight missiles each, appeared at the National Day parade. xxxvii The future “mainstay” of China’s nuclear forces, the road-mobile DF-41 reportedly possesses an operational range of 15,000 km and is MIRV-capable. xxxviii The missile will likely share key technologies with the JL-3, China’s next-generation SLBM.

China’s exhibition of new drones, electronic warfare systems, and missiles reflects its priority on developing advanced technologies, exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities, and completing its regional reconnaissance-strike complex. xxxix While Beijing can range U.S. theater forces with long-range missiles, its investments in radar and reconnaissance drones have enhanced its ability to target them. xl Meanwhile, China’s procurement of advanced electronic warfare systems threatens to deny the United States these same advantages, jamming U.S. ISR platforms and decoupling its kill chain.

Through its parade, China has offered the clearest indication of its vision for future warfare. Jammer-equipped aircraft, trucks, and ships will blind U.S. sensors. A networked complex of drones, radars, and satellites will feed vital targeting information to China’s missile forces. And future hypersonic weapons, flying fast and low, will evade U.S. missile defenses.

Offsetting China’s growing capabilities calls for investment into more than just comparable technologies. It will require swift evolution of defensive measures like hardened datalinks and air and missile defenses. Furthermore, maintaining U.S. military advantages will require a nimbler defense acquisition process that can match the pace of China’s rapid development and fielding. Maintaining strong alliances in the Asia Pacific and taking regional leadership militarily and economically will also be crucial. The PRC’s vision of “informationized warfare” may well represent the most advanced military threat that the United States and its allies will face in the twenty-first century. U.S. defense priorities should reflect this gravity.

Ian Williams is a fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Masao Dahlgren is an intern with the CSIS Missile Defense Project. This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2019 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Appendix: Selected Missile Systems Displayed in China’s 70th National Day Parade, October 1, 2019  

i “President Xi reviews armed forces on National Day,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201910/01/content_WS5d934bbac6d0bcf8c4c14815.html ; Wang Pufeng, “The Challenge of Information Warfare,” China Military Science, (Spring 1995), https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/chinview/chinapt4.html#7 . ii Eric C. Anderson and Jeffrey G. Engstrom, Capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to Carry Out Military Action in the Event of a Regional Military Conflict (Reston, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 2009), https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/legacy/AppImages/military%20conflict%202008.pdf ; Fan Yongqiang et al., “The PLA’s collection of equipment is the largest in its history,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9642336.htm ; Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003). iii John W. Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): p. 5 – 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539167?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. iv Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1600/RR1628/RAND_RR1628.pdf . v Robert P. Ashley Jr., “Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends,” (speech, Washington, DC, May 29, 2019), https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/ ; Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019): p. 171 – 178, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511?needAccess=true ; Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019): p. 73 – 84, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891?needAccess=true ; Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (2019): p. 122 – 134, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needAccess=true . vi “China’s new-type informationized armed forces debut at National Day parade,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201910/01/content_WS5d92f473c6d0bcf8c4c147a0.html . vii Li Guoli and Li Bingfeng, “Information Operations 2 nd Party Team: ‘Electromagnetic Sword’ wins invisible battlefield,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9641418.htm . viii Zhu Hongliang, “The 3 rd party of unmanned combat: the elite ‘cavalry’ of the land and sea battlefield,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9641431.htm . ix W.R. Alan Dayton, Winning the Invisible Fight: The Need for Spectrum Superiority (Washington: http://defense360.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Transition45-Dayton-Spectrum-Superiority-1.pdf . x “PLA Strategic Support Force formation debuts in National Day parade,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201910/01/content_WS5d92ea12c6d0bcf8c4c14784.html ; Elsa B. Kania and John K. Costello, “The Strategic Support Force and the Future of Chinese Information Operations,” Cyber Defense Review 3, no. 1 (Spring 2018): p. 105 – 122, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26427379.pdf . xi Yang Sheng and Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese military commissions GJ-11 stealth attack drone,” Global Times, October 1, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165939.shtml . xii Zhu Hongliang, “Unmanned combat 1 st team: high-altitude high-speed unmanned reconnaissance aircraft black paint debut,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9641416.htm . xiii Andreas Rupprecht, “Images suggest WZ-8 UAV in service with China’s Eastern Theatre Command,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 4, 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/91701/images-suggest-wz-8-uav-in-service-with-china-s-eastern-theatre-command . xiv Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, “China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile—Developments and Missing Links,” Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (2009), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1796&context=nwc-review . xv Gabriel Dominguez and Neil Gibson, “Image shows ground-launched variant of China’s YJ-12 anti-ship missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 8, 2018, https://www.janes.com/article/84351/image-shows-ground-launched-variant-of-china-s-yj-12-anti-ship-missile . xvi Michael Pilger et al., China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific (Washington: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2015), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf . xvii “China unveils new anti-ship missiles,” Xinhua , October 1, 2019, http://english.www.gov.cn/news/topnews/201910/01/content_WS5d92c5d1c6d0bcf8c4c14749.html ; David Ewing and Malcolm Fuller, IHS Jane’s Weapons: Naval 2016 – 2017 (London: IHS Markit, 2016), p. 19 – 20; Bradley Perrett, “YJ-18 Anti-Ship Missile Appears in Chinese Parade,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, October 1, 2019, https://aviationweek.com/awindefense/yj-18-anti-ship-missile-appears-chinese-parade . xviii Zhang Xuanjie and Li Bingfeng, “Long Sword-100 Cruise Missile Team: ‘Long Miles’,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9641437.htma . xix Liu Zhen, “Did China just accidentally show off its new supersonic cruise missile?” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3030552/did-china-just-accidentally-show-its-new-supersonic-cruise . xx Yang Sheng and Liu Xuanzun, “DF-17 ballistic missile makes debut at National Day parade,” Global Times, October 1, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165933.shtml . xxi Richard D. Fisher Jr., “US officials confirm sixth Chinese hypersonic manoeuvring strike vehicle test,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 26, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20151129233721/https:/www.janes.com/article/56282/us-officials-confirm-sixth-chinese-hypersonic-manoeuvring-strike-vehicle-test . xxii Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed With a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” The Diplomat, December 28, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/ . xxiii Mary Kate Aylward, “Hypersonic weapons: Revolutionary or just new?” Army AL&T Magazine, (October – December 2018), https://www.army.mil/article/209949/hypersonic_weapons_revolutionary_or_just_new . xxiv “DF-26 (Dong Feng-26),” Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/ . xxv Jordan Wilson, China’s Expanding Ability to Conduct Conventional Missile Strikes on Guam (Washington: US-China Security and Economic Review Commission, 2016), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China%27s%20Expanding%20Ability%20to%20Conduct%20Conventional%20Missile%20Strikes%20on%20Guam.pdf . xxvi Henri Kenhmann, “DF-26: the very long-range anti-ship ballistic missile is finally revealed,” East Pendulum, March 11, 2017, http://www.eastpendulum.com/df-26-le-missile-balistique-antinavire-a-tres-longue-portee-se-devoile-enfin ; Lee Jeong-ho, “China releases footage of ‘Guam-killer’ DF-26 ballistic missile in ‘clear message to the US’,” South China Morning Post, January 28, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2183972/china-releases-footage-guam-killer-df-26-ballistic-missile-clear . xxvii Henri Kenhmann, “DF-26: 1 st operational fire after entry into service,” East Pendulum, September 18, 2016, http://www.eastpendulum.com/df-26-1er-tir-operationnel ; Eric Gomez, “Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at China’s Military Anniversary Parade,” The Diplomat, August 8, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/meet-the-df-31ag-and-the-df-26-the-big-ballistic-missiles-at-chinas-military-anniversary-parade/ . xxviii Kenhmann, “DF-26: the very long-range anti-ship ballistic missile is finally revealed.” xxix “DF-5 (Dong Feng-5 / CSS-4),” Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-5-ab/ . xxx “Expert: What’s behind China’s trial launch of DF-5C intercontinental missile,” China Military, February 14, 2017, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-02/14/content_7487613.htm . xxxi Bill Gertz, “China Tests Missile With 10 Warheads,” The Washington Free Beacon, January 31, 2017, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-tests-missile-10-warheads/ . xxxii “Expert: What’s behind China’s trial launch of DF-5C intercontinental missile,” China Military. xxxiii Zhang Xuanjie and Li Bingfeng, “Dong Feng-5B nuclear missile team: a strong shield to safeguard national sovereignty,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, http://81.cn/jmywyl/2019-10/01/content_9641457.htm . xxxiv Kristensen and Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019.” xxxv Gomez, “Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at China’s Military Anniversary Parade.” xxxvi “JL-2 (Ju Lang-2/CSS-NX-14),” Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jl-2/ . xxxvii Yang Sheng and Liu Xuanzun, “China debuts most advanced ICBM DF-41 at parade,” Global Times, October 1, 2019, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1165931.shtml ; Hans M. Kristensen, “New Missile Silo And DF-41 Launchers Seen In Chinese Nuclear Missile Training Area,” Federation of American Scientists, September 3, 2019, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2019/09/china-silo-df41/ . xxxviii Xinhuanet, “China unveils most advanced Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles,” China Military, October 1, 2019, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-10/01/content_9642096.htm . xxxix U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Washington, DC: 2019), https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf ; Yves-Heng Lim, “Expanding the Dragon’s Reach: The Rise of China’s Anti-access Naval Doctrine and Forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1-2, (2017): p. 146 – 168, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2016.1176563 . xl Dennis M. Gormley et al., A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier: Assessing China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2014), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/force-multiplier.pdf .

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Masao dahlgren, programs & projects.

China’s hypersonic missiles threaten US power in the Pacific – an aerospace engineer explains how the weapons work and the unique threats they pose

Director, Center for National Security Initiatives; Professor of Aerospace Engineering Sciences, University of Colorado Boulder

Disclosure statement

Iain Boyd receives funding from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Department of Energy, NASA, and Lockheed-Martin.

University of Colorado provides funding as a member of The Conversation US.

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China’s newest hypersonic missile, the DF-27 , can fly as far as Hawaii, penetrate U.S. missile defenses and pose a particular threat to U.S. aircraft carriers , according to news reports of an assessment from the Pentagon .

Chinese researchers claimed in a May 2023 research journal report that the country’s hypersonic missiles could destroy a U.S. carrier group “with certainty .” This capability threatens to sideline U.S. aircraft carrier groups in the Pacific, potentially shifting the strategic balance of power and leaving the U.S. with limited options for assisting Taiwan in the event China invades.

This shift in the balance of power highlights how the next-generation hypersonic missiles that China, Russia and the U.S. are developing pose a significant threat to global security. I am an aerospace engineer who studies space and defense systems, including hypersonic systems. These new systems pose an important challenge due to their maneuverability all along their trajectory. Because their flight paths can change as they travel, defending against these missiles requires tracking them throughout their flight.

A second important challenge stems from the fact that they operate in a different region of the atmosphere from other existing threats. The new hypersonic weapons fly much higher than slower subsonic missiles but much lower than intercontinental ballistic missiles. The U.S. and its allies do not have good tracking coverage for this in-between region, nor do Russia or China.

Destabilizing effect

Russia has claimed that some of its hypersonic weapons can carry a nuclear warhead. This statement alone is a cause for concern whether or not it is true. If Russia ever operates this system against an enemy, that country would have to decide the probability of the weapon being conventional or nuclear.

In the case of the U.S., if the determination were made that the weapon was nuclear, then there is a very high likelihood that the U.S. would consider this a first strike attack and respond by unloading its nuclear weapons on Russia . The hypersonic speed of these weapons increases the precariousness of the situation because the time for any last-minute diplomatic resolution would be severely reduced.

It is the destabilizing influence that modern hypersonic missiles represent that is perhaps the greatest risk they pose. I believe the U.S. and its allies should rapidly field their own hypersonic weapons to bring other nations such as Russia and China to the negotiating table to develop a diplomatic approach to managing these weapons.

What is hypersonic?

Describing a vehicle as hypersonic means that it flies much faster than the speed of sound, which is 761 miles per hour (1,225 kilometers per hour) at sea level and 663 mph (1,067 kph) at 35,000 feet (10,668 meters) where passenger jets fly. Passenger jets travel at just under 600 mph (966 kph), whereas hypersonic systems operate at speeds of 3,500 mph (5,633 kph) – about 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) per second – and higher.

Hypersonic systems have been in use for decades. When John Glenn came back to Earth in 1962 from the first U.S. crewed flight around the Earth , his capsule entered the atmosphere at hypersonic speed. All of the intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world’s nuclear arsenals are hypersonic, reaching about 15,000 mph (24,140 kph), or about 4 miles (6.4 km) per second at their maximum velocity.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles are launched on large rockets and then fly on a predictable trajectory that takes them out of the atmosphere into space and then back into the atmosphere again. The new generation of hypersonic missiles fly very fast, but not as fast as ICBMs. They are launched on smaller rockets that keep them within the upper reaches of the atmosphere.

Three types of hypersonic missiles

There are three different types of non-ICBM hypersonic weapons: aero-ballistic, glide vehicles and cruise missiles. A hypersonic aero-ballistic system is dropped from an aircraft, accelerated to hypersonic speed using a rocket and then follows a ballistic, meaning unpowered, trajectory. The system Russian forces have been using to attack Ukraine, the Kinzhal , is an aero-ballistic missile. The technology has been around since about 1980.

A hypersonic glide vehicle is boosted on a rocket to high altitude and then glides to its target, maneuvering along the way. Examples of hypersonic glide vehicles include China’s Dongfeng-17 , Russia’s Avangard and the U.S. Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike system. U.S. officials have expressed concern that China’s hypersonic glide vehicle technology is further advanced than the U.S. system.

A hypersonic cruise missile is boosted by a rocket to hypersonic speed and then uses an air-breathing engine called a scramjet to sustain that speed. Because they ingest air into their engines, hypersonic cruise missiles require smaller launch rockets than hypersonic glide vehicles, which means they can cost less and be launched from more places. Hypersonic cruise missiles are under development by China and the U.S. The U.S. reportedly conducted a test flight of a scramjet hypersonic missile in March 2020.

Defensive measures

The primary reason nations are developing these next-generation hypersonic weapons is how difficult they are to defend against due to their speed, maneuverability and flight path. The U.S. is starting to develop a layered approach to defending against hypersonic weapons that includes a constellation of sensors in space and close cooperation with key allies

With all of this activity on hypersonic weapons and defending against them, it is important to assess the threat they pose to national security. Hypersonic missiles with conventional, non-nuclear warheads are primarily useful against high-value targets, such as an aircraft carrier. Being able to take out such a target could have a significant impact on the outcome of a major conflict.

However, hypersonic missiles are expensive and therefore not likely to be produced in large quantities. As seen in the recent use by Russia, hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a silver bullet that ends a conflict.

This is an updated version of an article that was originally published on April 15, 2022.

• Ballistic missiles
• Missile defence
• Nuclear missiles
• Cruise missiles
• The Pacific
• Hypersonic weapons

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• Missiles of the World

Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3)

Hong niao series.

Hong Niao Development

The Hong Niao missile family is similar in shape and size to the Russian AS-15A “Kent” (Kh-55) and SS-N-21 “Sampson” (3M10) and to the U.S. RGM-109 “Tomahawk” cruise missiles. The missiles have a circular-shaped body, with two wings, a low tailplane, and a vertical fin mounted on the upper side that unfolds after launch. An air inlet for the turbojet engine is located under the body at the rear of the missile.

Including the tandem-mounted booster rocket, the HN-1 measures 7.2 m in length, 0.5 m in body diameter, and 2.5 m in wing span. The booster rocket weights 200 kg, bringing the missile’s total launch weight to 1,200 kg. The HN-1 can reportedly carry a 400 kg payload, which could be a 20 to 90 kT nuclear warhead, high explosive warhead, or submunitions warhead. 2 Subsequent missile variants may vary in these measurements.

Hong Niao 1

Hong niao 2, hong niao 3.

• “C-602 (HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN-2000),” in IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016 , ed. James C. O’Halloran (United Kingdom: IHS, 2015), 115-119.
• Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of American Scientists , Vol. 72, Issue 4, 2016, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194054.
• Report refers to the Hong Niao missiles as the DH-10. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 , Annual Report to Congress, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf, 31.
• “C-602 (HN-1/-2/-3/YJ-62/X-600/DH-10/CJ-10/HN-2000),” in I HS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic 2015-2016 , 115-119.

China tested hypersonic weapons twice, ‘stunned’ US: Report

US President Biden concerned about the report but one expert says technology is not new as he warns of another ‘pointless’ arms race.

China conducted not one, but two tests of new hypersonic weapons in July and August, the Financial Times (FT) newspaper has reported, raising more concerns in the United States about the growing military capabilities of its geopolitical rival.

The London-based Financial Times reported on Thursday that Beijing launched a rocket that employed a “fractional orbital bombardment” system to propel a nuclear-capable “hypersonic glide vehicle” around the Earth for the first time on July 27, according to four people familiar with US intelligence assessments.

Keep reading

China denies report of hypersonic missile test, china tested new space capability with hypersonic missile: report, north korea says it tested hypersonic missile.

More than two weeks later on August 13, China conducted a second hypersonic test, the report said citing two people familiar with the matter.

The newspaper initially reported, in a story published over the weekend that the first test was done in August, instead of the end of July.

The latest report said that the missile test “stunned” American military and intelligence officials about the Chinese military advance.

It further said that US scientists “were struggling to understand” the hypersonic weapon’s capability, “which the US does not currently possess”.

In response to the FT’s initial report, China’s Foreign Ministry said that it had only launched a space plane and the test took place on July 16.

“It’s understood that this was a routine test of a space vehicle to verify technology of spacecraft’s reusability,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on Monday.

Zhao was quoted by state-owned broadcaster CGTN as saying that the test was “essential” for reducing the cost of spacecraft use, and providing a convenient and inexpensive way for humans to use space for “peaceful purposes”.

US ‘very concerned’

In a statement earlier this week, US State Department spokesperson Ned Price said that the administration of President Joe Biden was very concerned about the latest development in China’s nuclear arms capability and “novel delivery systems”.

Reporters travelling with Biden on Wednesday also asked him if he was concerned by the report, and he replied, “Yes”.

According to estimates and analysis, hypersonic weapons travel in the upper atmosphere at speeds of up to 6,200 kilometres per hour (3,853 miles per hour) – more than five times the speed of sound, which travels at about 1,235 km/h (767 mph) and evade even the most advanced radar systems.

#China #Hypersonics SCOOP China conducted 2 hypersonic weapons tests this summer. One stunned US officials because China demonstrated a capability the US does not have & government scientists do not understand how China pulled off the unspecified feat. https://t.co/M24rXrYwxM — Demetri Sevastopulo (@Dimi) October 20, 2021

On Monday, US Senator Angus King described the new weapon as a “strategic game-changers with the dangerous potential to fundamentally undermine strategic stability as we know it”.

“The implications of these weapons under development by China or Russia could be catastrophic,” the senator from Maine was quoted by reports as saying.

The US is also said to be racing to develop its own hypersonic weapon technology.

According to reports, US military contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies are involved in the missiles’ development.

Writing for the Foreign Policy magazine, Jeffrey Lewis, a non-proliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, said that China’s test was “unwelcome news”, but he added that the technology was “not new”, pointing out that the Soviet Union deployed the same system during the Cold War.

Lewis, however, warned that the latest development “is yet another step in a pointless, costly, and dangerous arms race”.

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U.S.-China Economic AND Security Review Commission

China’s new yj-18 antiship cruise missile: capabilities and implications for u.s. forces in the western pacific.

In April 2015, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence confirmed that China has deployed the YJ-18 antiship cruise missile (ASCM) on some People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy submarines and surface ships. The YJ-18’s greater range and speed than previous Chinese ASCMs, along with its wide deployment across PLA platforms, would significantly increase China’s antiaccess/area denial capabilities against U.S. Navy surface ships operating in the Western Pacific during a potential conflict. The YJ-18 probably will be widely deployed on China’s indigenously built ASCM-capable submarines and newest surface ships by 2020, and China could develop a variant of the YJ-18 to replace older missiles in its shore-based ASCM arsenal. This paper assesses the capabilities of the YJ-18 and describes the implications of its wide deployment for U.S. forces operating in the Western Pacific. The author exclusively used open source information and considered the capabilities of similar missiles to assess the likely characteristics of the YJ-18.

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A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China

With missiles, submarines and alliances, the Biden administration has built a presence in the region to rein in Beijing’s expansionist goals.

By John Ismay ,  Edward Wong and Pablo Robles April 26, 2024

U.S. officials have long seen their country as a Pacific power, with troops and arsenals at a handful of bases in the region since just after World War II.

U.S. military or partner bases

But the Biden administration says that is no longer good enough to foil what it sees as the greatest threat to the democratic island of Taiwan — a Chinese invasion that could succeed within days.

The United States is sending the most advanced Tomahawk cruise missiles to Japan and has established a new kind of Marine Corps regiment on Okinawa that is designed to fight from small islands and destroy ships at sea.

The Pentagon has gained access to multiple airfields and naval bases in the Philippines , lessening the need for aircraft carriers that could be targeted by China’s long-range missiles and submarines in a time of war.

The Australian government hosts U.S. Marines in the north of the country, and one of three sites in the east will soon be the new home for advanced American-made attack submarines. The United States also has a new security agreement with Papua New Guinea.

Potential submarine bases

Xi Jinping, China’s leader, and other officials in Beijing have watched the U.S. moves with alarm. They call it an encirclement of their nation and say the United States is trying to constrain its main economic and military rival.

Since the start of his administration, President Biden has undertaken a strategy to expand American military access to bases in allied nations across the Asia-Pacific region and to deploy a range of new weapons systems there. He has also said the U.S. military would defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion.

On Wednesday, Mr. Biden signed a $95-billion supplemental military aid and spending bill that Congress had just passed and that includes $8.1 billion to counter China in the region. And Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken traveled to Shanghai and Beijing this week for meetings in which he planned to raise China’s aggressive actions around Taiwan and the South China Sea.

Earlier in April, the leaders of the Philippines and Japan met with Mr. Biden at the White House for the first such summit among the three countries. They announced enhanced defense cooperation, including naval training and exercises, planned jointly and with other partners. Last year, the Biden administration forged a new three-way defense pact with Japan and South Korea.

President Biden held a trilateral meeting earlier this month with the leaders of Japan and the Philippines at the White House.

Yuri Gripas for The New York Times

“In 2023, we drove the most transformative year for U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific region in a generation,” Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said in a statement following an interview.

The main change, he said, is having American forces distributed in smaller, more mobile units across a wide arc of the region rather than being concentrated at large bases in northeast Asia. That is largely intended to counter China’s efforts to build up forces that can target aircraft carriers or U.S. military outposts on Okinawa or Guam.

These land forces, including a retrained and refitted U.S. Marine littoral regiment in Okinawa, will now have the ability to attack warships at sea.

For the first time, Japan’s military will receive up to 400 of their own Tomahawk missiles — the newest versions of which can attack ships at sea as well as targets on land from over 1,150 miles away.

The Pentagon has also gained access rights for its troops at four additional bases in the Philippines that could eventually host U.S. warplanes and advanced mobile missile launchers, if Washington and Manila agree that offensive weaponry can be placed there.

The United States has bilateral mutual defense agreements with several allied nations in the region so that an attack on the assets of one nation could trigger a response from the other. Bolstering the U.S. troop presence on the soil of allied countries strengthens that notion of mutual defense.

In addition, the United States continues to send weapons and Green Beret trainers to Taiwan, a de facto independent island and the biggest flashpoint between the United States and China. Mr. Xi has said his nation must eventually take control of Taiwan, by force if necessary.

“We’ve deepened our alliances and partnerships abroad in ways that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago,” Kurt Campbell, the new deputy secretary of state, told reporters last year, when he was the top Asia policy official in the White House.

What Deters China?

Taiwan’s foreign minister, Joseph Wu, said in an interview in Taipei that the strengthened alliances and evolving military force postures were critical to deterring China.

“We are very happy to see that many countries in this region are coming to the realization that they also have to be prepared for further expansions of the P.R.C.,” he said, referring to the People’s Republic of China.

To some Chinese military strategists, the U.S. efforts are aimed at keeping China’s naval forces behind the “first island chain” — islands close to mainland Asia that run from Okinawa in Japan to Taiwan to the Philippines.

U.S. military assets along these islands could prevent Chinese warships from getting into the open Pacific waters farther east if conflict were to break out.

Leaders in China’s People’s Liberation Army also talk of establishing military dominance of the “second island chain” — which is farther out in the Pacific and includes Guam, Palau and West Papua.

First Island Chain

Second Island Chain

philippines

But several conservative critics of the administration’s policies argue that the United States should be keeping major arms for its own use and that it is not producing new ships and major weapons systems quickly enough to deter China, which is rapidly growing its military .

Some American commanders acknowledge the United States needs to speed up ship production but say the Pentagon’s warfighting abilities in the region still outmatch China’s — and can improve quickly with the right political and budget commitments in Washington.

“We have actually grown our combat capability here in the Pacific over the last years,” said Adm. Samuel J. Paparo Jr., the incoming commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. “But our trajectory is still not a trajectory that matches our adversary. Our adversaries are building more capability and they’re building more warships — per year — than we are.”

Mr. Paparo said new American warships were still more capable than the ones China is building, and the U.S. military’s “total weight of fires” continued to outmatch that of the People’s Liberation Army, for now.

Warplanes on the flight deck of U.S.S. Carl Vinson, an aircraft carrier, during a joint U.S. and Japanese military exercise in the Philippine Sea in January.

Richard A. Brooks/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty , a Cold War-era arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow, prohibited land-based cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 311 miles and 3,420 miles. But after the Trump administration withdrew from the pact, the United States was able to develop and field a large number of small, mobile launchers for previously banned missiles around Asia.

Even with the deployment of new systems, the United States would still rely on its legacy assets in the region in the event of war: its bases in Guam, Japan and South Korea, and the troops and arms there.

All of the senior U.S. officials interviewed for this story say war with China is neither desirable nor inevitable — a view expressed publicly by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III. But they also insist that a military buildup and bolstering alliances, along with diplomatic talks with China, are important elements of deterring potential future aggression by Beijing.

Chen Jining, the Communist Party chief in Shanghai, told Mr. Blinken on Thursday that “whether China and the U.S. choose cooperation or confrontation, it affects the well-being of both peoples, of both nations, and also the future of humanity.”

U.S. military or

partner bases

The new deterrent effort is twofold for American forces: increasing patrolling activities at sea and the capabilities of its troop levels ashore.

To the former, the Pentagon has announced that U.S. Navy warships will participate in more drills with their Japanese counterparts in the western Ryukyu Islands near Taiwan and with Filipino ships in the South China Sea, where the Chinese coast guard has harassed ships and installations controlled by the Philippines .

A swarm of Chinese militia and Coast Guard vessels chased a Philippine Coast Guard ship in the South China Sea last year.

Jes Aznar for The New York Times

To the latter, Marine Corps and Army units already in the Pacific have recently fielded medium- and long-range missiles mated to small, mobile trucks that would have been prohibited under the former treaty.

These trucks can be quickly lifted by Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft or larger cargo planes to new locations, or they can simply drive away to evade a Chinese counterattack. A new flotilla of U.S. Army watercraft being sent to the region could also be used to reposition troops and launchers from island to island.

In an interview last year with The New York Times, Gen. David H. Berger, then the Marine Corps’ top general, said the service had begun analyzing strategic choke points between islands where Chinese forces were likely to transit throughout the Pacific. He said the service had identified sites where Marine assault forces like the new Okinawa-based littoral regiment could launch attacks on Beijing’s warships using these new weapons.

Philippines

Partner bases

The Pentagon announced in February last year a new military base-sharing agreement with Manila, giving U.S. forces access to four sites in the Philippines for use in humanitarian missions, adding to the five sites previously opened to the Pentagon in 2014. Most of them are air bases with runways long enough to host heavy cargo planes.

Plotting their locations on a map shows the sites’ strategic value should the United States be called upon to defend their oldest treaty ally in the region , if the Philippines eventually agrees to allow the U.S. military to put combat troops and mobile missile systems there.

One, on the northern tip of Luzon Island, would give missile-launching trucks the ability to attack Chinese ships across the strait separating Philippines from Taiwan, while another site about 700 miles to the southwest would allow the U.S. to strike bases that China has built in the Spratly Islands nearby.

In 2023, the United States committed $100 million for “infrastructure investments” at the nine bases, with more funds expected this year.

The Pentagon has forged closer military ties with Australia and Papua New Guinea , extending America’s bulwark against potential attempts by the Chinese military at establishing dominance along the “second island chain.”

The Obama administration moved a number of littoral combat ships to Singapore and deployed a rotating force of Marines to Darwin, on Australia’s north coast, giving the Pentagon more assets that could respond as needed in the region.

Last year, the Biden administration greatly elevated its commitment to Australia, which is one of America’s most important non-NATO allies.

The U.S.S. North Carolina, a Virginia-class submarine, docking in Perth, Australia last year.

Tony Mcdonough/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A new multibillion dollar agreement called AUKUS — for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — will permanently transfer some of the U.S. Navy’s newest Virginia-class attack subs to Canberra . The location of the new bases for those subs has not been announced, but the first group of Australian sailors who will crew them graduated from nuclear power training in America in January.

These stealthy submarines, which can fire torpedoes and Tomahawk missiles, will potentially add to the number of threats Beijing faces in case of a regional war.

Just north of Australia, an agreement in August gave U.S. forces more access to Papua New Guinea for humanitarian missions and committed American tax dollars to update military facilities there.

To Admiral Paparo, this growing network of partnerships and security agreements across thousands of miles of the Pacific is a direct result of what he calls China’s “revanchist, revisionist and expansionist agenda” in the region that has directly threatened its neighbors.

“I do believe that the U.S. and our allies and partners are playing a stronger hand and that we would prevail in any fight that arose in the Western Pacific,” the admiral said in an interview.

“It’s a hand that I would not trade with our would-be adversaries, and yet we’re also never satisfied with the strength of that hand and always looking to improve it.”

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'Should not harm...': China's guarded response to India's BrahMos missiles delivery to Philippines

India on Friday delivered the first batch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the Philippines as part of a $375 million deal struck in 2022. China is currently locked in a conflict with the Philippines over maritime disputes in the South China Sea.

China is currently embroiled in a heated conflict with the Philippines over their territorial claims in the South China Sea, with both countries trading accusations over a series of maritime run-ins. China claims almost the entire South China Sea, a conduit for more than $3 trillion of annual ship-borne commerce, including parts claimed by the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei.

BrahMos Aerospace Pvt Ltd, an India-Russian joint venture, produces supersonic cruise missiles that can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft, or land platforms. BrahMos missile flies at a speed of 2.8 Mach or almost three times the speed of sound. In January 2022, India sealed a deal with the Philippines to supply three batteries of the missile. It is the first export of the BrahMos missile by India. A few other countries including Argentina have also shown interest in procuring BrahMos missiles from India. 

What was China's response?

Addressing a media briefing, Chinese Defence Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said, "China always believes that defence and security cooperation between countries should not harm the interest of any third party and should not harm regional peace and stability." Wu also criticised the US for deploying medium-range ballistic missiles in the Philippines this month amid regional tensions.

The deployment of the MRC missile system, also known as the Typhon system, to the Indo-Pacific theatre comes amid a series of US-Philippine military exercises, including the largest-ever edition of the annual bilateral Balikatan drills beginning early this week. The 1,600-km mid-range capability missiles which were deployed in northern Luzon of the Philippines could reach China's coast.

"China firmly opposes the US deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles in the Asia-Pacific. Our position is clear and consistent. The US' move severely threatens the security of regional countries and undermines regional peace and stability," Wu said. "We hope the relevant country could refrain from opening the door to the devil, which will only end up hurting everyone including itself."

Why is India exporting missiles to the Philippines?

India has been looking at further expanding defence ties with the Philippines against the backdrop of growing global concerns over China's increasing military assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Indian and US missile deliveries arrived in the Philippines as Manila was locked in a bitter naval standoff with the Chinese navy in the South China Sea.

Philippines' claim over the 200-mile Scarborough Shoal lies was upheld by an arbitration decision in 2016 under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. However, China refused to recognise the 2016 arbitration ruling amid tense standoffs in the region. Chinese coast guard ships have also blocked Filipino government vessels delivering supplies and personnel to the Second Thomas Shoal, resulting in near-collisions that the Philippine government has condemned and protested.

India will also post its defence officials in countries including Ethiopia, Mozambique, Ivory Coast, Philippines, Armenia and Poland in line with its broader policy initiative to expand strategic ties with key regions. The decision to appoint defence attaches in African countries like Ethiopia, Mozambique and Ivory Coast is in sync with New Delhi's priority to expand its strategic engagement with the African continent, according to an official.

Notably, in recent years, India has been positioning itself as a leading voice, flagging concerns, challenges and aspirations of the Global South or the developing nations, especially the African continent. It is also learnt that New Delhi is planning to rationalise the strength of its teams of military officials in its embassy in Moscow and high commission in London.

(with inputs from agencies)

ALSO READ |  BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles delivered to Philippines by India

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North Korea says it tested ‘super-large’ cruise missile warhead and new anti-aircraft missile

Korean Central News Agency released photos showing at least two missiles being fired off launcher trucks on a runway. The missiles in the image were not identified. State media said North Korea’s missile administration on Friday conducted a ‘power test’ for the warhead designed for the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile and a test-launch of the Pyoljji-1-2 anti-aircraft missile.

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A TV screen shows an image of North Korea’s missile launch during a news program at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Saturday, April 20, 2024. North Korea said Saturday it tested a “super-large” cruise missile warhead and a new anti-aircraft missile in a western coastal area as it expands military capabilities in the face of deepening tensions with the United States and South Korea. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

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South Korean army soldiers pass by the barbed-wire fence in Paju, South Korea, near the border with North Korea, Friday, April 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

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U.S. Army soldiers from the Eighth Army compete during the Expert Soldier, Infantry, and Medic Badge (E3B) competition at the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon, South Korea, Friday, April 19, 2024. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon)

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Saturday it tested a “super-large” cruise missile warhead and a new anti-aircraft missile in a western coastal area as it expands military capabilities in the face of deepening tensions with the United States and South Korea.

North Korean state media said the country’s missile administration on Friday conducted a “power test” for the warhead designed for the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile and a test-launch of the Pyoljji-1-2 anti-aircraft missile. It said the tests attained an unspecified “certain goal.”

Photos released by the North’s official Korean Central News Agency showed at least two missiles being fired off launcher trucks at a runway.

North Korea conducted a similar set of tests Feb. 2, but at the time did not specify the names of the cruise missile or the anti-aircraft missile, indicating it was possibly seeing technological progress after testing the same system over weeks.

KCNA insisted Friday’s tests were part of the North’s regular military development activities and had nothing to do with the “surrounding situation.”

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are at their highest in years, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un dialing up his weapons demonstrations, which have included more powerful missiles aimed at the U.S. mainland and U.S. targets in the Pacific. The United States, South Korea and Japan have responded by expanding their combined military training and sharpening their deterrence strategies built around strategic U.S. assets.

Cruise missiles are among a growing collection of North Korean weapons designed to overwhelm regional missile defenses. They supplement the North’s vast lineup of ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at the continental United States.

Analysts say anti-aircraft missile technology is an area where North Korea could benefit from its deepening military cooperation with Russia , as the two countries align in the face of their separate, intensifying confrontations with the U.S. The United States and South Korea have accused North Korea of providing artillery shells and other equipment to Russia to help extend its warfighting in Ukraine.

North Korea fires ballistic missiles, South Korea, Japan say

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Reporting by Hyunsu Yim in Seoul and Rocky Swift in Tokyo; Writing by Jack Kim Editing by Kim Coghill, Gerry Doyle and Toby Chopra

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Seoul-based reporter covering the Koreas with a focus on South Korean politics, North Korea's missile tests and the K-pop industry. Before joining Reuters, he worked at The Korea Herald.

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